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OPINION OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge 
 We are asked to interpret provisions of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requiring federal prisons to 
withdraw certain amounts from prisoner trust accounts to pay 
                                              
1 The attorneys for the appellant are appearing pro bono 
following a prior order granting appellant’s motion to proceed 
in forma pauperis.  The judges of this court express our 
gratitude to those attorneys for accepting this matter pro bono 
and for the quality of their representation of their client.  We 
also thank Reed Smith, LLP and PNC for permitting them to 
offer their service.  Lawyers who act pro bono fulfill the 
highest service that members of the bar can offer to needy 
parties and to the legal profession. 
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court filing fees.  Although the amount of money involved 
may seem insignificant, the issue is of the utmost importance 
because it impacts indigent prisoners’ access to the courts and 
it has resulted in a conflict among the Courts of Appeals.2 
 Under the PLRA,3 a prisoner who files a civil 
complaint or an appeal in the federal courts is required to pay 
the full amount of the filing fee even if s/he is filing in forma 
pauperis (“IFP”).4  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), after 
making an initial payment, a prisoner must make monthly 
payments in the amount of 20 percent of the preceding 
month’s income until the filing fee is paid. 
 
 Michael Siluk is an indigent state prisoner who was 
allowed to file IFP in the district court and this Court.  He 
currently owes a filing fee to both courts ($350 to the Clerk of 
the District Court and $505 to the Clerk of this Court for his 
appeal).  Siluk argues that § 1915(b)(2) only requires a 20-
percent deduction from his prison account each month until 
both fees are paid, and that the deductions should be made in 
the order in which they were incurred (referred to as 
“sequential collection,” “sequential recoupment,” or “per 
inmate approach”).  The government argues that § 1915(b) 
requires that a monthly 20-percent deduction must be made 
concurrently for fees owed in both courts until the fees are 
paid  (referred to as “concurrent recoupment,” “simultaneous 
recoupment,” or “per case approach”).  The latter 
interpretation would result in a 40-percent deduction from 
                                              
 
2 See infra notes 18 and 26. 
3 Title VIII of Pub. L. No. 104-134, 100 Stat. 1321 (1996), 
amending 28 U.S.C. § 1915 et seq. 
 
4 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).  The IFP statute “is designed to 
ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the 
federal courts.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 
(1989) (emphasis added).  “Congress enacted the in forma 
pauperis statute to ensure that administrative court costs and 
filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone else who 
files a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from 
pursuing meaningful litigation.”  Deutsch v. United States, 67 
F.3d 1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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Siluk’s account each month that would continue until both 
fees are completely paid. 
 
 On January 11, 2013 this Court entered an order which 
among other things granted Siluk’s motion to proceed IFP; 
referred the petition to combine payments to a merits panel; 
and directed the Clerk of the Court to appoint pro bono 
counsel on behalf of Siluk to “address whether the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act requires recoupment of multiple 
encumbrances sequentially or simultaneously.”  For the 
reasons that follow, we conclude that Congress intended to 
cap the monthly debit for filing fees at 20 percent of a 
prisoner’s monthly income, even where, as here, an inmate 
owes more than one filing fee.5 
 
                                              
5 We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s final order 
under 28 U.S.C.  § 1291.  Although Siluk is appealing the 
order dismissing his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), as well 
as the court’s denial of his motion to consolidate court fees, 
we only need to discuss the latter issue.  The District Court 
thoroughly and carefully explained that Siluk’s claim against 
an officer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
 
The Eleventh Amendment “bar[s] suits for monetary damages 
by private parties in federal court against a state or against 
state agencies.  It also bars a suit against state officials in their 
official capacity, because the state is the real party in interest 
inasmuch as the plaintiff seeks recovery from the state 
treasury.”  Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(internal citations omitted).   
 
“All courts and agencies of the [Pennsylvania unified judicial 
system] are part of the Commonwealth government . . . [and] 
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Haybarger v. 
Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Pa. Const. art. V, § 1.  County 
domestic relations sections are part of the unified judicial 
system.  42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 961.  Accordingly, 
Merwin, in her official capacity as Director of the Perry 
County Domestic Relations Section, is entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  Melo, 912 F.2d at 6. 
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I.  Factual Background 
 
When this suit was filed, Siluk was an inmate at the 
State Correctional Institution at Rockview (“SCI Rockview”).  
He had filed various actions in state court claiming that state 
authorities had wrongfully intercepted his federal income tax 
refund and applied it to a child-support arrearage he allegedly 
owed.  After Siluk’s state court litigation proved 
unsuccessful, he filed this pro se complaint in federal district 
court, alleging that Catherine Merwin -- the Director of Perry 
County Domestic Relations Section -- had deprived him of 
his federal tax refund, in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The District Court granted Siluk’s motion to 
proceed IFP and ordered the collection of an initial partial 
filing fee, followed by monthly installments as required by § 
1915(b).6  The court subsequently dismissed Siluk’s 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).7 
 
Siluk appealed and applied to proceed IFP before us.  
He also filed a motion to combine payment of his filing fees 
which the district court denied.  Siluk seeks to make one 
combined payment of 20 percent of his prison account 
deposits, rather than a 40-percent deduction (20 percent for 
each fee owed), as urged by the government.  The sequential 
collection he requests would postpone collection of the filing 
fee for this appeal until after his filing fee has been 
completely paid to the district court.  
 
Siluk maintains that sequentially debiting his inmate 
account will leave him with sufficient funds to maintain a 
minimum quality of life that would otherwise be jeopardized.  
He purportedly lives on prison wages of around $40.00 a 
month after the 20-percent deduction of the District Court 
filing fee.  According to Siluk, he is required to pay for such 
items as: “soap, shampoo, razors, [and] deodorant” to 
                                              
6 As of the filing of his appellate brief, SCI Rockview has 
remitted eleven partial payments, totaling $119.98, toward 
Siluk’s $350.00 District Court filing fee.  Appx. 68-88. 
 
7 See Siluk v. Merwin, No. 11-1654, 2011 WL 4738147 (M.D. 
Pa. Sept. 16, 2011). 
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maintain basic hygiene.8  Siluk must also pay for the cost of 
proceeding in this matter.  He claims that those costs include 
such incidentals as “paper, pens, copies, carbon paper, [and] 
mail.”9 
 
II. Statutory Background 
 
 Under 28 U.SC. § 1915, federal courts are authorized 
to allow indigent persons, including prisoners, to pursue 
litigation without pre-paying fees and costs.10  Congress 
enacted the IFP statute “to ensure that administrative court 
costs and filing fees . . . would not prevent indigent persons 
from pursuing meaningful litigation.”11  Section 1915 was 
                                              
8 Appx. at 47 (Pet. To Combine Filing Fees at ¶ 4); see also 
id. at 52-53 (Prison Account Statement, reflecting 
commissary charges). 
 
9 Id.; see also id. (Prison Account Statement, reflecting 
postage charges).   
10 The relevant text of § 1915 is as follows: 
(b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a 
prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal 
in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required 
to pay the full amount of a filing fee.  The court 
shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a 
partial payment of any court fees required by 
law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent . . . 
. 
(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, 
the prisoner shall be required to make monthly 
payments of 20 percent of the preceding 
month’s income credited to the prisoner's 
account.  The agency having custody of the 
prisoner shall forward payments from the 
prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each 
time the amount in the account exceeds $10 
until the filing fees are paid. 
28 U.S.C. § 1915. 
11 Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 
  
7 
amended by the PLRA, “largely in response to concerns 
about the heavy volume of frivolous prisoner litigation in the 
federal courts.”12  Prior to the passage of the PLRA, courts 
could waive filing fees entirely.13  However, in enacting 
§ 1915(b)(1), Congress required that all indigent prisoners 
filing civil actions or appeals eventually “pay the full amount 
of a filing fee.”14 
  
 Section 1915(b) allows prisoners who qualify for IFP 
status to make an initial partial payment, followed by monthly 
payments against the remaining balance.15  Section 
1915(b)(1) requires an initial debit for partial payment of 
outstanding court fees when the funds in the prisoner’s 
account equal “20 percent of the greater of . . . (A) the 
average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account; or (B) the 
average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-
month period immediately preceding the filing of the 
                                                                                                     
(2001); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 
(1992). 
 
12 Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 312; see also 141 Cong. Rec. 
S14,408-01, S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Dole) (explaining that the number of prisoner suits filed 
“has grown astronomically -- from 6,600 in 1975 to more 
than 39,000 in 1994” ).  The increase correlates with policies 
that resulted in mass incarceration.  During this same period, 
the prison population underwent a dramatic increase.  Just 
over 500,000 people were incarcerated in prisons or jails in 
1980; over 1.3 million were incarcerated in 1993.  See Allen 
J. Beck & Darrell K. Gilliard, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
NCJ 151654, Prisoners in 1994, at 1 (1995), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/Pi94.pdf. 
 
13 Id. at 311-12 (“[P]risoners easily obtained I.F.P. status and 
hence were not subject to the same economic disincentives to 
filing meritless cases that face other civil litigants.”). 
 
14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 
 
15 See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 754 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
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complaint or notice of appeal.”16  Section 1915(b)(2) provides 
that, after the initial partial payment, the inmate must make 
“monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s 
income” whenever the account exceeds $10.00.17  The prison 
where the inmate is housed is responsible for withdrawing 
this money and “forward[ing] payments from the prisoner’s 
account to the clerk of the court.”18  This monthly payment 
scheme continues until the filing fee is fully discharged.19 
  
 This scheme is relatively clear when an inmate only 
owes one filing fee.  However, it is not clear how the 
deductions should be made when a prisoner owes more than 
one filing fee arising from multiple lawsuits or appeals of a 
single lawsuit.20 
  
                                              
16 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).  Prisoners need not make this 
initial partial payment if they do not have the available funds.  
See id. § 1915(b)(4) (requiring collection of the initial partial 
filing fee only when sufficient funds exist). 
 
17 Id. § 1915(b)(2). 
 
18 Id. 
 
19 Id. 
 
20 This issue is a matter of first impression for this Court, and 
there is a split of authority among our sister courts of appeals.  
The government argues that we have tacitly accepted the 
majority view of our sister courts of appeals, which is that the 
PLRA requires simultaneous recoupment.  See Ray v. Reed, 
680 F.3d 841, 841 (3d Cir. 2012) (reinstating the court’s prior 
order requiring simultaneous recoupment, where a prisoner 
owed multiple filing fees and sought to limit his monthly 
obligations to a single 20-percent payment).  However, the 
government fails to note that Fortune v. Patterson, No. 04-
377, 2009 WL 3166274, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2009), 
aff’d Fortune v. Hamberger, 379 F. App’x 116 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam) (unpublished), surmised that deducting filing 
fees at a rate greater than 20 percent was unlawful under the 
PLRA or § 1915. 
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 In this case, Siluk faces the prospect of paying two 
fees: (1) the $350 district court filing fee that he incurred by 
filing his pro se complaint; and (2) the $505 fee he incurred in 
this court for pursuing an appeal of the district court 
judgment.  All parties agree that Siluk must pay both fees 
eventually and that these fees should be deducted from his 
inmate account; however, there is a highly contested legal 
question as to the rate at which these fees should be paid. 
  
 In his petition, Siluk requests that this Court order that 
20 percent of his account balance, rather than 40 percent of 
his account balance, should be deducted each month, toward 
the payment of these fees.  That is, Siluk requests that a single 
20-percent payment be deducted, rather than two 20-percent 
payments (one toward his district court fee and one toward his 
appellate fee). 
  
 The question presented by Siluk’s request for 
consolidation of fees, as interpreted by the motions panel and 
as briefed by counsel is whether § 1915(b)(2) allows only a 
maximum of 20 percent to be taken from his monthly income 
regardless of the number of cases or appeals filed, or whether 
the PLRA requires 20 percent taken each month for each case 
or appeal that he undertakes. 
  
 These two conflicting interpretations of § 1915(b)(2) 
are referred to in the briefs and in the cases as “sequential” 
and “simultaneous” recoupment. 
  
 Sequential recoupment refers to the method of 
payment whereby a single 20-percent payment is withdrawn 
on a monthly basis.  For example, if an inmate had $10 in his 
or her account on the first of the month, the most that he or 
she could be required to pay toward his or her filings fees 
would be $2 (20 percent of the $10).  That one payment is 
withdrawn monthly, and the cases and/or appeals that an 
inmate has filed will be paid off sequentially.  Under such a 
rule, an inmate’s account could not be emptied in a single 
month based solely on the clerk’s withdrawal of a filing fee. 
  
 As applied to this case, sequential recoupment dictates 
that Siluk’s account would be subject to a single 20-percent 
charge each month, and these charges would be used to pay 
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off: (1) first his district court fee; and (2) then, only after his 
first fee was paid, his fee to this court for his appeal. 
  
 Simultaneous recoupment on the other hand, refers to a 
protocol whereby 20 percent of the inmate’s account is 
withdrawn for each case or appeal.  Under such a rule, fees 
are paid off simultaneously, and an inmate’s account could be 
emptied in a single month by the clerk of the court.  For 
example, unlike for the sequential rule, under this reading of 
the statute if an inmate had $10 and owed money in five cases 
the clerk would deduct $2 for each case thus emptying the 
inmate’s account. 
  
 As applied to this case, simultaneous recoupment 
dictates that the clerk of this Court and the clerk of the 
District Court would each withdraw 20 percent of Siluk’s 
account simultaneously. 
  
 Given the PLRA’s text, structure, and purpose, we 
conclude that Congress intended the monthly payments 
mandated under the PLRA to be debited from an inmate’s 
account sequentially.  Sequential recoupment provides 
prisoners with a reasonable economic disincentive to file 
frivolous claims, without being punitive or imposing such 
significant burdens that a prisoner might forgo asserting 
legitimate claims. 
 
A.  Text and Structure of § 1915 
  
 As noted earlier, §1915(b) establishes a gradual two-
step garnishment procedure to ensure payment of filing fees.  
Subsection (b)(1) lays out the procedure for calculating and 
remitting the initial partial payment.  It provides: 
 
if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an 
appeal [IFP], the prisoner shall be required to 
pay the full amount of a filing fee.  The court 
shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a 
partial payment of any court fees required by 
law, an initial partial filing fee[.]”21 
                                              
21  28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 
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This subsection unambiguously applies to each action or 
appeal that a prisoner files, whether or not the prisoner has 
filed other suits that are pending.  The controversy here stems 
from the ambiguity that arises when subsection (b)(1) is read 
in conjunction with the explanation of how the remainder of 
the filing fee must be paid, which is set forth in subsection 
(b)(2).  Subsection (b)(2) states: “[a]fter payment of the initial 
partial filing fee,” prisoners must “make monthly payments of 
20 percent of the preceding month’s income  . . . until the 
filing fees are paid.”22 
  
 The Supreme Court has explained that the words of a 
statute “must be read in their context with a view to their 
place in the overall statutory scheme.”23  Accordingly, a 
“provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation[]” can be 
“clarified by the remainder of the [statute].”24  The text of § 
1915 must therefore be read as a whole, so that the content 
and operation of one provision can illuminate the proper 
construction of another.25  It is also crucial that we not lose 
sight of the Supreme Court’s admonition that a statute 
permitting an individual to file IFP not be interpreted in a 
manner that would deprive litigants of the “last dollar they 
have.”26  In Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., the 
                                              
22  Id. § 1915(b)(2). 
 
23 Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 
(1989); see also SimmsParris v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 652 
F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 2011). 
24 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1754 
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dolan v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (“Interpretation 
of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory 
text, considering [its] purpose and context[.]”). 
 
25 See, e.g., Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“Section 1915(b)(3) must be read in the context of § 
1915(b) as a whole.”). 
 
26 Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 
339 (1948). 
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Court explained that “[w]e cannot agree . . . that one must be 
absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit of the [IFP] statute.”27 
  
 Here, the government argues that construing the text 
and structure of § 1915 as requiring something other than 
simultaneous recoupment creates a disjunction.28  According 
                                              
27 Id. 
 
28 The government asks us to adopt the view of the majority 
of our sister circuits, including the Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, which have 
interpreted § 1915(b)(2) to require prisoners pay 20 percent of 
their funds towards filing fees concurrently, per case and per 
appeal.  See Pinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (holding that the PLRA requires a separate installment 
payment for each case in which a filing fee is owed); 
Christensen v. Big Horn County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 374 
F. App’x 821, 829-33 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) 
(embracing a “consistent reading of the similar provisions in 
§§ 1915(b)(1) and (b)(2)”); Atchison v. Collins, 288 F.3d 177, 
180-81 (5th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that the word “court” 
appearing in both § 1915(b)(1) and (b)(2) should be read to 
refer to the “instant action,” separate from previously filed 
lawsuits); Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Group, Inc., 146 F.3d 609, 
612 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Because the PLRA fee provisions were 
designed to require prisoners to bear financial responsibility 
for each action they take, the [20]-percent rule should be 
applied per case.”); Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 436-37 
(7th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Lee v. Clinton, 
209 F.3d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000) and Walker v. O’Brien, 
216 F.3d 66, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e hold that the fees 
for filing the complaint and appeal cumulate.  . . .  The PLRA 
is designed to require the prisoner to bear some marginal cost 
for each legal activity.”). 
 
District courts in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have also 
followed the “per case,” or “simultaneous recoupment” 
interpretation of § 1915.  See Hendon v. Ramsey, 478 F. 
Supp. 2d 1214, 1219 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (adopting the Fifth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Atchison v. Collins, 288 F.3d 177, 180-
81 (5th Cir. 2002)); Samonte v. Frank, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 
1243 (D. Haw. 2007) (concluding that the “per case” 
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to the government, because subsection (b)(1), which pertains 
to the initial filing fee on a per-case basis regardless of the 
number of outstanding fees, sequential recoupment would 
result in an interpretative disconnect: an inmate could 
postpone paying subsequent fees under subsection (b)(2), but 
not the fees required (for each case) under subsection (b)(1).29  
The government concludes that because subsection (b)(1) 
requires that an inmate pay filing fees on a per-case basis, 
Congress intended subsection (b)(2) to operate in the same 
manner. 
 
However, the two subsections address different 
situations and neither the statutory text nor the relationship 
between the two subsections suggests that we read the statute 
with such rigidity.  Subsection (b)(1) deals with a one-time 
initial partial filing fee withdrawn “when [and only when] 
funds exist.”30  The amount of that fee is based on income or 
account balance during the prior six months.31  In contrast, 
subsection (b)(2) deals with ongoing monthly payments that 
are withdrawn only when the prisoner’s account balance 
“exceeds $10.”32  The amount debited pursuant to subsection 
                                                                                                     
interpretation of  § 1915 was the more practical approach); 
Lyon v. Kentucky State Penitentiary, No. 02-P53-R, 2005 WL 
2044955, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23, 2005) (finding that the 
Sixth Circuit implicitly adopted the “per case” interpretation 
in McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997)). 
 
29 See, e.g., Atchison, 288 F.3d at 180-81 (holding that, in 
order to read § 1915 consistently, (b)(2) should correspond 
with (b)(1), in which the initial partial filing fee is imposed in 
each case); Newlin, 123 F.3d at 436 (holding that, because the 
“PLRA is designed to require the prisoner to bear some 
marginal cost for each legal activity,” subsection (b)(2)’s 
requires recoupment on a per-encumbrance basis: “A prisoner 
who files one suit remits 20 percent of income to his prison 
trust account; a suit and an appeal then must commit 40 
percent, and so on.”). 
30 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 
 
31 Id. 
 
32 Id. § 1915(b)(2). 
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(b)(2) is based on the prior month’s income.33  In addition, as 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained in 
Torres v. O’Quinn, subsection (b)(1) specifically references 
“payment of any court fees[,]” 34 implying that “the [20-
]percent exaction applies to all court fees, in total.”35 
 
Nothing in subsection (b)(2)’s language, requiring 
monthly payments to “the clerk of the court, . . . until the 
filing fees . . . are paid[,]”36 suggests that Congress intended 
that “the clerk” simultaneously refer to two different clerks in 
two different courts.  Congress could certainly have required 
monthly payments to multiple clerks of different courts, or 
the same clerk for multiple filings until each filing fee is paid.  
Congress did not use language that would have achieved that 
result.  Rather, the statute refers to “fees” relating to an 
“action or appeal.”37  The logical conclusion is that Congress 
recognized that multiple “fees” might be owed, but required 
sequential payments for only one case at a time. 
  
 Nevertheless, the government argues that, because 
“[t]he rest of Section 1915 addresses each case individually,” 
subsection (b)(2) should also be construed to require a 
monthly payment for each case a prisoner has filed.38  That 
view is inconsistent with other provisions of the statute, 
which do not have the same ambiguity as that which arises 
from the interplay between subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2).  For 
example subsection (g), known as the PLRA’s “three strikes” 
rule, does not address each case individually.  Subsection (g) 
prohibits an inmate from bringing a case if s/he has, on three 
                                                                                                     
 
33 Id. 
 
34 Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 245 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
 
35 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 
36 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 
37 Id. § 1915(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 
38 Gov. Br. at 13 n.6. 
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or more prior occasions, brought an action or appeal in 
federal court “that was dismissed on the grounds that it [was] 
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted.”39  Clearly, Congress there intended to 
review a prisoner’s overall litigation history, not merely one 
case at a time.40 
  
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explained that the 
various subsections of § 1915 reflect the PLRA’s multi-
pronged approach to reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in 
federal courts.41  However, subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) 
impact the congressional purpose in different, but 
complimentary, ways.  Subsection (b)(1) establishes a 
mechanism to ensure that all prisoners pay an initial partial 
filing fee whenever a filing fee would be required for a 
claimant who was not filing IFP.42  This up-front cost forces 
prisoners to make reasoned choices about whether to file a 
law suit.  Subsection (b)(2), then, establishes the garnishment 
procedure of subsequent monthly payments to completely pay 
the balance of all filing fees after the initial partial payment.43  
It addresses the method by which further fees can be 
collected, while subsection (b)(1) insures that payment of the 
“full amount” of the fees “shall be required[.]”44  Thus, we do 
                                              
39 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 
 
40 Other portions of § 1915 that do not apply on a per-case 
basis include subsection (d), which is a blanket rule that 
pertains to all cases brought under § 1915, and subsection 
(e)(1), which provides that “[t]he court may request an 
attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.”  
Id. §§ 1915(d), (e)(1). 
41 Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2011) (noting 
that the PLRA “placed a series of controls on prisoner suits, 
constraints designed to prevent sportive filings in federal 
court.”). 
 
42 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 
 
43 Id. § 1915(b)(2). 
 
44 Id. § 1915(b)(1). 
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not believe there is anything inconsistent about reading these 
two subsections to establish a scheme of sequential 
recoupment of fees. 
  
 We therefore agree with the conclusion of the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit that the reference to an initial 
partial payment of “any court fees . . . impl[ies] that multiple 
fees and costs should each be subject to a uniform ceiling [of 
20 percent].”45 
 
B.  Purpose of the PLRA 
  
 When congressional intent is clear from the text of a 
statute, we do not delve into legislative history or focus on the 
statutory scheme.46  However, in light of the discord among 
courts of appeals, and the apparent tension between 
subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), it is appropriate to consider the 
purpose of the statutory scheme to ensure that our 
interpretation is consistent with Congress’s objectives in 
enacting these provisions.47  As the Supreme Court has 
explained, the meaning of “certain words or phrases may only 
become evident when placed in context . . . and with a view 
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”48 
  
 The Supreme Court has noted that the overarching 
purpose of the PLRA is to implement “a series of controls” 
                                              
45 Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 276 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 
46 In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 
(3d Cir. 2010), as amended (May 7, 2010) (“‘When the words 
of a statute are unambiguous, then this first canon is also the 
last: judicial inquiry is complete.’” (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank 
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992))). 
 
47 See Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 
(2006) (“Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon 
reading the whole statutory text, considering [its] purpose and 
context[.]”). 
 
48 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 
U.S. 644, 666 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
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designed to prevent meritless filings in federal court.49  In 
enacting the PLRA, “Congress sought to put in place 
economic incentives that would prompt prisoners to ‘stop and 
think’ before filing a complaint.”50 
  
 Congress did not enact the PLRA to punish inmates for 
filing suits, nor did it intend to deter prisoners from filing 
valid claims.51  In fact, § 1915(b)(4) specifically provides that 
“[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a 
civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the 
reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which 
to pay the initial partial filing fee.”52  Congress was, 
therefore, keenly aware of the need to safeguard a prisoner’s 
constitutional right of access to the courts.53 
                                              
49 Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2011); see also 
Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 318 & n.3 (3d Cir. 
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 533 
U.S. 953 (2001). 
 
50 Id. (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S7,498-01, S7,526 (daily ed. 
May 25, 1995) (Sen. Kyl)). 
 
51 See 141 Cong. Rec. S7,526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (Sen. 
Kyl) (“The filing fee is small enough not to deter a prisoner 
with a meritorious claim . . . .”); 141 Cong. Rec. S14,627 
(daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (Sen. Hatch) (“I do not want to 
prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims.”); see also 
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977) (“More recent 
decisions have struck down restrictions [to prisoners’ 
constitutional right of access to the courts] and required 
remedial measures to insure that inmate access to the courts is 
adequate, effective, and meaningful.”); see generally Ex parte 
Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (“[T]he state and its officers 
may not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a 
federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.”). 
 
52 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). 
 
53 The Supreme Court has held that prisoners have a 
constitutional right to bring court challenges to vindicate 
“‘basic constitutional rights.’”  Allah v Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
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 In order to balance the competing objectives of 
preserving a prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the 
courts while deterring frivolous litigation, § 1915(b) requires 
that an IFP prisoner make an initial payment towards the 
filing fee, but permits the prisoner to pay the balance of his or 
her fees over an extended period of time. Pursuant to this 
scheme, the initial partial filing fee can be withdrawn only 
“when funds exist” in the prisoner’s account.54  Thereafter, 
monthly payments, pegged at 20 percent of the prisoner’s 
account balance, are withdrawn only when the account 
balance “exceeds $10.”55 
 
Concurrent recoupment is inconsistent with the 
purpose of the PLRA because, although Congress intended to 
deter frivolous litigation by requiring IFP prisoners to bear 
some marginal cost, Congress did not intend to create a 
payment scheme that would ensure fees be paid as 
expeditiously as possible or that would create tension with an 
inmate’s constitutional right of access to the courts.56 
  
 Citing Newlin v. Helman, the government argues that 
sequential recoupment would undermine Congress’s intent to 
deter frivolous prisoner litigation by allowing a prisoner to 
“postpone” indefinitely his or her monthly payments for any 
additional lawsuit until after all previous filing fees had been 
paid.57  We realize, of course, that sequential recoupment is 
                                                                                                     
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
U.S. 539, 579 (1974)). 
54 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 
 
55 Id. § 1915(b)(2). 
 
56 As we noted at the outset, and as Siluk’s allegations 
suggest, although the amounts appear “marginal,” they can be 
quite substantial to an inmate subsisting on nominal prison 
wages. 
57 See Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1997), 
overruled on other grounds by Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 
1027 (7th Cir. 2000) and Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 66, 
628-29 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Christensen v. Big Horn 
County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 374 F. App’x 821, 830 (10th 
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less of a deterrent to frivolous claims, but that consideration 
does not alter our analysis.  Although Congress was 
concerned that prisoners would pay their filing fee, Congress 
was clearly not as concerned about when the payment 
occurred.  As Senator Dole explained during the debates on 
the PLRA, “when prisoners know that they will have to pay 
these costs -- perhaps not at the time of filing, but eventually -
- they will be less inclined to file a lawsuit in the first 
place.”58  That is precisely the point. 
 
Congress could have required payments of more than 
20 percent of the previous month’s income or imposed a time 
limit for payment of all outstanding fees if § 1915 was 
intended to collect filing fees as quickly as practicable.  
However, that is not what Congress did.  Although Congress 
wanted to encourage indigent prisoners to think before 
bringing claims, it did not want to subject inmates to 
unacceptable hardships in order to pursue judicial redress.59 
                                                                                                     
Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (observing that the PLRA’s “pay-as-
you-go constraint[] would be diluted if not defeated by 
permitting prisoners with one ongoing case to postpone all 
successive filing fee obligations”); Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity 
Group, Inc., 146 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting “per 
inmate” approach to the “PLRA[’s] fee provisions” as 
inconsistent with Congress’s intent). 
 
58 See 141 Cong. Rec. S14,413-14 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Dole). 
 
59 See also Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 
U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948) (noting that an undesirable result 
would be a “statutory interpretation [that] . . . force[s] a 
litigant to abandon what may be a meritorious claim in order 
to spare himself complete destitution.”).  This Court has also 
repeatedly held that “prisoners are not required to surrender 
those small amenities of life which they are permitted to 
acquire in a prison in order to litigate [IFP.]”  Jones v. 
Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Bullock v. 
Suomela, 710 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 1983); Souder v. 
McGuire, 516 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1975). 
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 Moreover, concerns that sequential repayment will not 
sufficiently deter meritless claims are alleviated by subsection 
(g)’s “three strikes” rule.60  That is a “powerful economic 
incentive” aimed specifically at repeat filers to prevent them 
from filing more “frivolous lawsuits or appeals.”61  
Subsection (g) seeks to penalize prisoners who have filed 
multiple, meritless claims, and revokes the IFP “privilege” 
from those who have had “three strikes,” “no matter how 
meritorious subsequent claims may be.”62  Subsection (b), on 
the other hand, is a moderate measure only intended to 
address prisoners filing lawsuits without considering the merit 
of their claims.63   
  
 Accordingly, there is a clear difference between the 
purpose of § 1915(g) and the rest of the PLRA.  As the 
government agrees, § 1915(g) is structured to deter frivolous 
suits while protecting a prisoners’ right of access to the 
courts.64  Accordingly, we need not interpret § 1915(b)(2) as 
                                              
60 As discussed above, § 1915(g) states “if [a] prisoner has, on 
3 or more prior occasions,” brought an action or appeal in 
federal court “that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted[,]” then “[i]n no event shall [the] prisoner” 
bring an action or appeal IFP.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  
Subsection (g) contains an exception permitting a prisoner 
with three strikes to file an IFP action if s/he is “under 
imminent danger of serious physical injury.”  Id. 
 
61 Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3d Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001) (emphasis added). 
 
62 Id. 
 
63 Although, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Torres, the 
statutory requirement, that all filing fees be paid, deters 
frivolous litigation on its own, without further requiring 
simultaneous recoupment.  Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 
247 (4th Cir. 2010). 
64 See Gov. Br. at 22. 
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requiring simultaneous fee collection in order to advance the 
congressional concern with frivolous lawsuits.65 
 Nevertheless, we recognize that the contrary view, as 
expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
Newlin, has gained some support.  In Newlin, the Court 
reasoned that, because the PLRA is designed to “require the 
prisoner to bear some marginal cost for each legal activity,” 
simultaneous recoupment is most consistent with the statute’s 
purpose because it exacts that price the soonest.66  The Newlin 
Court was concerned that, “[u]nless payment begins soon 
after the event that creates the liability, this will not happen[]” 
and prisoners could file “multiple suits for the price of one.”67  
However, that analysis conflates the distinct objectives of 
ensuring payment of all filing fees and expediting payment of 
fees.  Neither the text of the statute nor the legislative history 
supports this view.  In fact, that interpretation is in direct 
conflict with the text of § 1915(b) because the PLRA’s filing 
                                              
65 In addition to the “three strikes” rule of subsection (g), 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) permits IFP privileges to be 
automatically revoked on appeal if the trial court certifies that 
the appeal is meritless.  Additionally, in cases brought by a 
plaintiff proceeding IFP, the court is directed to “dismiss the 
case at any time if [it] determines that . . . the action or appeal 
. . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on 
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief 
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also id. § 1915A(a)-(b) 
(containing a similar requirement for all prisoner cases which 
“seek[] redress from a governmental entity”).  If the court 
dismisses an action or appeal on one of these grounds, the 
prisoner nonetheless remains liable for paying the filing fee in 
full.  See, e.g., J.A. 49 (“[T]he prisoner is obligated to pay the 
entire filing and/or docketing fee . . . regardless of the 
outcome of the proceeding or appeal.”); see also Porter v. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 564 F.3d 176, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
66 See Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1997), 
overruled on other grounds by Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 
1027 (7th Cir. 2000) and Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 66, 
628-29 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 
67 Id. at 436-37. 
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fee provisions explicitly permit a prisoner to postpone the 
payments indefinitely if the inmate’s account balance never 
exceeds $10.00.68  Moreover, sequential payment does not 
mean that an inmate can file “multiple suits for the price of 
one.”  The prisoner still has to pay all fees incurred, the 
amount of each individual payment is simply capped at 20 
percent of the prior month’s balance, and the payments are 
stretched over a greater period of time.69 
  
 The Newlin Court’s concern that, under a sequential 
collection scheme, a prisoner filing multiple suits could 
“postpon[e] payment of the fees for later-filed suits until after 
the end of imprisonment (and likely avoid them 
altogether)[]”70 is also misplaced.  Although appellate courts 
do not agree on the interpretation of the payment mechanism 
in § 1915(b)(2), there is consensus among appellate courts 
that an inmate’s obligation to fully pay all fees incurred is not 
coterminous with the inmate’s incarceration.71 
                                              
68 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 
 
69 Under either a simultaneous or sequential recoupment 
approach, § 1915 requires the prisoner to repay the entire 
filing fee, eventually.  See id. §§ 1915(b)(2), (3) (filing fee 
payments continue “until the filing fees are paid”); see also 
Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 243 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that, under a sequential collection scheme, a 
prison could “collect the funds to pay the fees accrued by a 
specific inmate, and then distribute those funds to the 
appropriate court until that court’s fees are paid in full.  After 
satisfying the first court, the prison would continue to collect 
funds and use them to pay the next court in sequence.”). 
 
70 Newlin, 123 F.3d at 436. 
71 All appellate courts to have reached this issue have held 
that the obligation is not coterminous.  See Robbins v. 
Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that, under 
the PLRA, “release does not eliminate an obligation that 
could and should have been met from the trust account while 
imprisonment continued.”); In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1251 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing that “if a litigant is a prisoner 
on the day he files a civil action, the PLRA applies.”); Gay v. 
Tex. Dep’t of Corr., 117 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1997) 
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 As we have noted, the majority of view (of 
simultaneous recoupment) could result in 100 percent of a 
prisoner’s income being garnished to pay filing fees.72  We 
cannot imagine a valid penological or rehabilitative purpose 
in creating a risk that inmates would have to surrender the 
necessities of daily subsistence.  We find nothing in the 
legislative history of § 1915 that would allow us to impute 
such a draconian intent to Congress.73  Rather, we agree with 
the observation of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
that “[t]he garnishment of more than twenty percent of an 
indigent inmate’s already meager income crosses the line 
from deterrence to punishment and was not the intent behind 
§ 1915.”74 
                                                                                                     
(holding that § 1915’s filing-fee requirement applied to an 
inmate even though he was released,  because he “file[d] an 
appeal” while he was a prisoner); McGann v. Comm’r, Soc. 
Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1996) (construing the 
PLRA to “require[] partial fee payments . . . only while the 
prisoner remains in prison, and that, upon his release, his 
obligation to pay fees is to be determined, like any non-
prisoner, solely by whether he qualifies for i.f.p. status.”). 
 
72 Pinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(acknowledging that simultaneous recoupment could subject 
“100% of a prisoner’s income” to recoupment); Newlin v. 
Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled on 
other grounds by Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1027 (7th 
Cir. 2000) and Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 66, 628-29 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (observing that, under a simultaneous recoupment 
plan, “[f]ive suits or appeals mean that the prisoner’s entire 
monthly income must be turned over to the court until the 
fees have been paid.”). 
 
73 See also Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 
2010) (“Congress put a limit on garnishment from an 
inmate’s (already meager) income, understanding that a 
‘chilling effect’ on litigation was not the same as a complete 
bar on filing suits, which may occur if close to one hundred 
percent of an inmate’s income is taken to pay his filing 
fees.”). 
74 Id. 
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We therefore conclude that sequential recoupment 
harmonizes subsection (b)(2) with the purpose of the statute, 
while avoiding the constitutionally suspect result of erecting 
barriers to courts that would make some inmates choose 
between attempting to seek redress for legitimate claims and 
having enough money in one’s prison account to purchase 
items required for basic hygiene.75 
 
C.  Constitutional Concerns 
  
 Our conclusion is consistent with the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance.  If a statute can be construed two 
ways, “by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional 
questions arise and by the other of which such questions are 
avoided,” our duty is to “adopt the latter.”76 
  
 Siluk argues that simultaneous recoupment, by 
permitting the garnishment of anywhere from 40 to 100 
percent of a prisoner’s income, risks violating prisoners’ 
Eighth Amendment rights by rendering a prisoner unable to 
buy necessary hygiene supplies.77  The government argues 
                                              
75 See also id. at 246-47 (explaining that the sequential 
interpretation of § 1915(b) “both satisfies Congress’s intent 
when passing the PLRA and protects the constitutional rights 
of inmates.”); Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 276 (2d Cir. 
2001) (reasoning that § 1915 provides a “uniform ceiling [of 
20 percent] in a compromise between the imperative to 
collect fees . . . and the right of prisoners to effective access 
to the courts[,]” even where plaintiff owes fees in multiple 
cases). 
 
76 United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 819 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
77 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (holding 
that under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners have a right to 
the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”); Garcia 
v. Kimmell, 381 F. App’x 211, 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam) (unpublished) (holding that “those minimal 
necessities include provision for basic hygiene.”) (citing 
Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1406 (10th Cir. 1996); 
Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 363 (3d Cir. 1992), 
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that this concern is misplaced, because prison systems are 
constitutionally bound to provide inmates with the necessities 
of life, including “‘adequate food, clothing, shelter, and 
medical care,’”78 “as well as with ‘paper and pen to draft legal 
documents[.]’”79  The government asserts that the Adkins 
Court’s fear of “forc[ing] a litigant to abandon what may be a 
meritorious claim in order to spare himself complete 
destitution,”80 is therefore inapplicable in the prison context.  
Thus, the government concludes, adopting the simultaneous-
payment interpretation to § 1915(b)(2) simply will not force a 
prisoner to choose between paying for a lawsuit and 
satisfying his or her most basic needs. 
  
 However, the government’s argument is undermined 
by the allegations here.81  Siluk claims he is “required to pay 
for . . . soap, shampoo, razors, [and] deodorant.”82  Moreover, 
while prisons provide basic hygienic supplies to those who 
cannot afford them, courts have often had to resolve claims of 
prisoners who claim that what is provided is so meager as to 
                                                                                                     
superseded by statute, Title VIII of Pub. L. No. 104-134, 100 
Stat. 1321 (1996)). 
 
78 Gov. Br. at 23-24 (quoting Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. 
Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 
79 Id. at 24 (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25 
(1977)). 
 
80 Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 
340 (1948). 
81 This case is before us following Siluk’s appeal of the 
District Court’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
dismissal, Siluk’s application to proceed IFP before us, and 
Siluk’s motion to combine payment of his filing fees.  In 
reviewing a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), “we accept all factual allegations as true, construe 
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  
Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
 
82 Appx. at 47 (Pet. to Combine Filing Fees at ¶ 4). 
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deny basic amenities.83  Additionally, Siluk states that he is 
required to pay for certain costs incurred in bringing this 
action, such as paper, pens, copies, carbon paper, and mail.  
He argues that he should “have enough funds available to 
continue with this action[.]”84  We agree, and find that his 
assertion raises constitutional concerns regarding his access to 
the courts.85 
  
 In Abdul-Akbar, we upheld the PLRA’s “three strikes” 
provision, which requires some prisoners to pay their entire 
filing fees before their complaints are adjudicated.86  There, 
we concluded that “requiring a prisoner to pay filing fees in a 
civil case does not, without more, violate that prisoner’s right 
of meaningful access to the courts.”87  However, imposing the 
scheme of concurrent debits advocated by the government 
certainly could result.  For example, simultaneous 
recoupment of filing fees from previous suits could impede a 
prisoner seeking redress for abuses that may not necessarily 
result in serious bodily injury or death.88  We will not 
                                              
83 See, e.g., Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 363 (3d Cir. 
1992); see also Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1406 (10th 
Cir. 1996). 
 
84 Appx. at 52-53 (Prison Account Statement, reflecting 
postage charges). 
 
85 As noted above, the Second and Fourth Circuits have 
declined to require prisoners who file multiple lawsuits to pay 
more than 20 percent of their monthly income toward filing 
fees because of this exact concern.  Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 
F.3d 237, 242, 247-48 (4th Cir. 2010); Whitfield v. Scully, 
241 F.3d 264, 276-77 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 
86 Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 
(2001). 
 
87 Id. at 317. 
 
88 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (establishing an exception to the 
“three strikes” rule for a prisoner who “is under imminent 
danger of serious physical injury.”); see also Torres, 612 F.3d 
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construe the PLRA in a way that would prevent prisoners 
from vindicating their fundamental rights in a judicial 
forum.89 
  
 We realize, of course, that several of our sister circuit 
courts have rejected the contention that simultaneous 
recoupment is unconstitutional because there is no 
constitutional right to proceed IFP.90  Although there may not 
be a constitutional right to proceed IFP, it cannot be doubted 
that we should avoid interpreting § 1915(b) in a manner that 
would erect obstacles to an inmate’s ability to seek redress in 
court for legitimate grievances unless the text of the statute 
requires such an interpretation. 
  
 The Supreme Court has clearly stated that we have a 
duty to “avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that 
engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative 
                                                                                                     
at 248 (recognizing that a “per case” interpretation of § 
1915(b) could force prisoners to choose “between saving their 
meager income and searching for a remedy for abuses in 
prison” that do not rise to the level of serious physical injury). 
 
89 Mayer v. Chicago, 480 U.S. 189, 198 (1971); see also 
Whitfield, 241 F.3d at 277 (explaining that courts should 
“avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders 
constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation 
poses no constitutional question.” (quoting Gomez v. United 
States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989))). 
90 Atchison v. Collins, 288 F.3d 177, 179-81 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(finding that no “serious constitutional questions [are] raised” 
by the simultaneous collection of fees in each case under § 
1915(b) because “indigent persons have no constitutional 
right to proceed [IFP]” and “states are constitutionally bound 
to provide [prisoners] with the necessities of life.”; Lefkowitz 
v. Citi-Equity Group, Inc., 146 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(finding that, “[b]ecause the PLRA fee provisions were 
designed to require prisoners to bear financial responsibility 
for each action they take, the [20]-percent rule should be 
applied simultaneously per case.”). 
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interpretation poses no constitutional question.”91  Here, there 
is such a reasonable alternative that is supported by the text 
and purpose of the PLRA: sequential recoupment. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that  § 1915 
permits the recoupment of only 20 percent of a prisoner’s 
monthly income for filing fees, regardless of how many civil 
actions or appeals the prisoner elects to pursue, thereby 
adopting the sequential recoupment rule advocated by the 
petitioner. 
                                              
91 Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864. 
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Siluk v. Merwin 
No. 11-3996 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge, dissenting.   
 
 The majority holds that under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), a 
prisoner who owes multiple filing fees is required to pay them 
sequentially, not simultaneously, such that a prisoner pays no 
more than 20% of the preceding month’s income each month, 
no matter how many separate filing fees he owes.  I 
respectfully disagree, and would join the majority of our 
sister Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue in 
holding that § 1915(b) requires a prisoner who has incurred 
multiple filing fees to pay them simultaneously.  An 
interpretation requiring that fees be paid simultaneously is the 
most natural reading of the statute and is more consistent with 
the purpose of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 
than is a sequential approach.  Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent.1 
 
       I. 
 
       A. 
 
 In Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, we discussed the history 
and development of the PLRA.  See 239 F.3d 307, 311-12 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (en banc).  We observed that “[t]he discretionary 
power to permit indigent plaintiffs to proceed without first 
paying a filing fee was initially codified in the federal statutes 
in 1892.”  Id. at 311.  Congress enacted the PLRA in 1996, 
“largely in response to concerns about the heavy volume of 
frivolous prisoner litigation in the federal courts.”  Id. at 312.  
Because prisoners easily achieved in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 
status, Congress concluded that they were not “subject to the 
same economic disincentives to filing meritless cases that 
face other civil litigants,” and, accordingly, the PLRA 
instituted a number of reforms designed to “prompt prisoners 
to ‘stop and think’ before filing a complaint.”  Id. at 318.  
                                              
1 I do join my learned colleagues, however, in thanking the 
attorneys who handled this matter pro bono and in 
commending them for their excellent representation. 
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 Among other reforms, the PLRA amended the IFP 
statute as it applies to prisoners.  Under the PLRA, prisoners 
who qualify for IFP status are no longer excused from paying 
filing fees altogether, but rather are required to pay them in 
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), which provides:  
 
(1) [I]f a prisoner brings a civil action or files an 
appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be 
required to pay the full amount of a filing fee. 
The court shall assess and, when funds exist, 
collect, as a partial payment of any court fees 
required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 
percent of the greater of — 
 (A) the average monthly deposits to the 
prisoner’s account; or 
 (B) the average monthly balance in the 
prisoner’s account for the 6- month period 
immediately preceding the filing of the 
complaint or  notice of appeal. 
(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, 
the prisoner shall be required to make monthly 
payments of 20 percent of the preceding 
month’s income credited to the prisoner’s 
account. The agency having custody of the 
prisoner shall forward payments from the 
prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each 
time the amount in the account exceeds $10 
until the filing fees are paid. 
 
 This provision, while clearly (1) requiring prisoners to 
pay filing fees in full, and (2) permitting prisoners who 
qualify for IFP status to pay filing fees over time rather than 
up front, does not explicitly address what happens when a 
prisoner owes more than one filing fee at once.  The majority 
interprets the statute as requiring sequential payment of 
multiple filing fees, with a hard payment cap of 20% of a 
prisoner’s monthly income no matter how many filing fees he 
owes.  I disagree, and believe that the statute requires 
simultaneous payment of multiple filing fees.  A majority of 
Courts of Appeals having considered this issue support this 
view.  See Pinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1, 7-10 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (holding that § 1915(b) requires a prisoner who has 
incurred multiple filing fees to pay them simultaneously), 
 3 
 
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Bruce v. Samuels, 83 
U.S.L.W. 3640 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-844); 
Christensen v. Big Horn Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 374 F. 
App’x 821, 829-33 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (same); 
Atchison v. Collins, 288 F.3d 177, 180-81 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(per curiam) (same); Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Grp., Inc., 146 
F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Newlin v. Helman, 123 
F.3d 429, 435-36 (7th Cir. 1997) (same), overruled on other 
grounds, Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000).  
But see Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 242-53 (4th Cir. 
2010); Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 275-77 (2d Cir. 
2001).      
 
       B. 
 
 The Supreme Court has recently instructed that 
“reasonable statutory interpretation must account for both ‘the 
specific context in which . . . language is used’ and ‘the 
broader context of the statute as a whole.’”  Util. Air 
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) 
(quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) 
(alteration in original)).  The Court continued that “[a] 
statutory provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is 
often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . 
because only one of the permissible meanings produces a 
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.’”  
Id. (quoting United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood 
Forrest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (alteration in 
original)).  This is such a case, where the meaning of a 
provision, § 1915(b)(2), is clarified by the remainder of § 
1915.  See Christensen, 374 F. App’x at 829 (“The majority 
‘cumulative payment’ or ‘per case’ position with which we 
agree has been adopted based on standard interpretive 
principles (construing § 1915(b)(2) in light of the other 
provisions in § 1915).”).  In the past, we have similarly 
resorted to § 1915 or § 1915(b) “as a whole” to determine the 
meaning of a provision therein.  See, e.g., Hagan v. Rogers, 
570 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Section 1915(b)(3) must 
be read in the context of § 1915(b) as a whole.”); Abdul-
Akbar, 239 F.3d at 312, 314 (interpreting § 1915(g) in the 
context “of the PLRA as a whole”); Santana v. United States, 
98 F.3d 752, 756, 757 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that “the 
filing fee payment requirements of the PLRA set forth in 28 
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U.S.C. § 1915(b) do not apply to habeas corpus petitions or to 
appeals from the denial of such petitions” after considering 
the PLRA “as a whole”).    
 
   The text of § 1915(b)(2), which requires that “[a]fter 
payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be 
required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the 
preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s 
account,” does not explicitly answer the question of how 
multiple filing fees should be paid.  However, reading § 
1915(b)(2) in the context of § 1915(b) as a whole shows that 
the statute requires simultaneous recoupment of multiple 
filing fees.  It is clear from the text of § 1915(b)(1) and 
undisputed by the parties that a prisoner is required to pay an 
initial filing fee for each case or appeal he files – a “per-case” 
approach – no matter how many other fees he has paid or is 
paying.  See § 1915(b)(1) (requiring that “if a prisoner brings 
a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis . . . [t]he 
court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect . . . an initial 
partial filing fee. . . .”).  Accordingly, “[t]he plain text of [§ 
1915(b)(1)] calls for assessment of the initial partial filing fee 
each time a prisoner ‘brings a civil action or files an appeal.’”  
Pinson, 761 F.3d at 8 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)).  I 
agree with the Government that it is logical to interpret § 
1915(b)(2) to require that monthly payments of 20% be made 
for each case as well, and not for each prisoner, regardless of 
how many suits or appeals he or she files.  See Hendon v. 
Ramsey, 478 F.Supp. 2d 1214, 1219 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (“Thus, 
an initial filing fee is collected each time a prisoner initiates 
an action, rather than once per prisoner irrespective of the 
number of actions the prisoner has filed.”).  By contrast, 
reading a sequential (or “per-prisoner”) payment structure 
into § 1915(b)(2) would be inconsistent with the per-case 
approach of § 1915(b)(1). 
 
 The text of § 1915(b)(2) itself provides further support 
for a simultaneous recoupment approach, as the provision 
specifies that the prisoner must make monthly payments of 20 
percent “[a]fter payment of the initial partial filing fee.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).  If, as is undisputed, a prisoner must pay 
the initial filing fee for each suit filed, then the prisoner must 
immediately follow through and pay the monthly installment 
payments on the amounts remaining for the same action or 
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appeal the prisoner has filed.  Put another way, “[b]ecause the 
initial partial filing fee imposed in subsection (b)(1) acts as 
the ‘triggering condition’ for the monthly installments 
required by subsection (b)(2), the two provisions should be 
read in tandem.”  Pinson, 761 F.3d at 9 (quoting Torres v. 
O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 256 (4th Cir. 2010) (Niemeyer, J., 
dissenting)).  As a result, both § 1915(b)(1) and § 1915(b)(2) 
apply equally to each action or appeal filed, with no exception 
in either subsection for multiple filings.  See id. (“Given that 
the initial fee required by subsection (b)(1) applies on a per-
case basis, it follows that subsection (b)(2)’s monthly 
payment obligation likewise applies on a per-case basis.”). 
 
 Other provisions of § 1915 similarly reflect a per-case 
approach.  For example, § 1915(a)(2) provides that a 
“prisoner seeking to bring a civil action or appeal a judgment 
in a civil action or proceeding without prepayment of fees or 
security therefore . . . shall submit . . . a trust fund account 
statement . . . for the prisoner for the 6-month period 
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of 
appeal.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) (emphasis added).  In 
addition, § 1915(e)(2) provided that “[n]otwithstanding any 
filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the 
court shall dismiss the case at any time” if the court 
determines that the case is defective.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 
(emphasis added).  Finally, § 1915(f)(1) provides that a court 
may issue a judgment for costs “at the conclusion of the suit 
or action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(1) (emphasis added).  Again, 
these subsections exemplify the “per-case” approach common 
to all of § 1915.   
 
 For these reasons, I part ways with the majority, and 
would interpret § 1915(b)(2) to require that prisoners who 
owe multiple filing fees pay them simultaneously rather than 
sequentially.      
 
       C. 
 
A rule requiring simultaneous recoupment is consistent 
with the PLRA’s effort to require prisoners to incur a 
marginal cost for each additional lawsuit they file.  By 
requiring prisoners to bear additional costs for each suit, the 
PLRA encourages prisoners to absorb a portion of the 
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economic impact of their lawsuit and aggregate their claims 
in a single suit.  It also discourages frivolous lawsuits.   
 
Some of our sister Courts of Appeals have recognized 
as much in interpreting § 1915(b) to require simultaneous 
recoupment.  See, e.g., Pinson, 761 F.3d at 10 (observing that 
“the per-case approach comports with the PLRA’s basic 
object” because “[c]apping monthly withdrawals at twenty 
percent of an inmate’s income, regardless of the number of 
suits filed, would diminish the deterrent effect of the PLRA 
once a prisoner files his first action”);  Lefkowitz, 146 F.3d at 
612 (“Because the PLRA provisions were designed to require 
prisoners to bear financial responsibility for each action they 
take, the twenty-percent rule should be applied per case.”); 
Newlin, 123 F.3d at 436 (holding that prisoners must make 
monthly payments for multiple filing fees simultaneously 
because “[o]therwise a prisoner could file multiple suits for 
the price of one, postponing payment of the fees for later-filed 
suits until after the end of imprisonment (and likely avoiding 
them altogether),” and “[t]he PLRA is designed to require the 
prisoner to bear some marginal cost for each legal activity”); 
see also Torres, 612 F.3d at 256 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) 
(observing that the majority’s holding, allowing for sequential 
payment of multiple filing fees, “gives prisoners, in effect, a 
free ride after they file their first piece of litigation”).     
 
 The marginal cost to prisoners of filing additional 
lawsuits or appeals might not only be delayed, but also might 
be eliminated entirely, as some of our sister Courts of 
Appeals have held that “the PLRA fee requirements are not 
applicable to a released prisoner.”  DeBlasio v. Gilmore, 315 
F.3d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 2003); accord McGann v. Comm’r, 
Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1996).  In 
DeBlasio, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held 
that, upon a prisoner’s release, his “obligation to pay filing 
fees is determined by evaluating whether he qualifies under 
the general in forma pauperis provision of 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(a)(1).”  315 F.3d at 397.  Section 1915(a)(1) excuses an 
indigent litigant from prepaying filing fees altogether, 
provided that the litigant files an affidavit including a 
statement of his assets and his inability to pay fees.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).  Accordingly, if prisoners are released 
from their payment obligations under the PLRA once they get 
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out of prison, under a sequential payment approach they 
would be able to postpone payment of all but one of their 
owed filing fees indefinitely until they are no longer obligated 
to pay them at all.   
 
Allowing prisoners to postpone or even escape their 
payment obligations is clearly contrary to the PLRA’s 
purpose, as it provides virtually no deterrent to filing an 
infinite number of lawsuits.  An interpretation requiring that 
fees be paid simultaneously is, therefore, more consistent 
with the purpose of the PLRA.   
  
       D. 
 
 Finally, I respectfully disagree with the majority that 
such a reading gives rise to constitutional concerns, either by 
treading on inmates’ rights under the Eighth Amendment or 
by barring inmates’ access to the courts. 
 
 We have observed that the Eighth Amendment 
requires prisons to provide “humane conditions of 
confinement” and “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, 
clothing, shelter, and medical care.”  Betts v. New Castle 
Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation 
marks omitted).  I agree with the Government that this 
obligation mitigates the concern we have expressed with 
respect to indigent non-prisoners, that they would have to 
choose between necessities like toothbrushes and a lawsuit.  
In the prison context, where prisons are obligated to provide 
such necessities, prisoners need not make this choice.2  As a 
result, our sister Courts of Appeals have rejected the 
argument that a simultaneous approach could violate 
prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights.  See, e.g., Pinson, 761 
F.3d at 9-10; Atchison, 288 F.3d at 181.   
 
 Nor would simultaneous recoupment bar inmates’ 
access to the courts.  With regard to the concern the majority 
raises, that inmates require tools such as pens and paper to 
file suit, the Supreme Court has made clear that “[i]t is 
                                              
2 The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections memorialized 
this requirement in Policy Statement DC-ADM 815 (effective 
May 29, 2009). 
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indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state 
expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents with 
notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to 
mail them.”  Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1977).  
Our sister Courts of Appeals have similarly rejected the 
argument that a simultaneous approach could violate 
prisoners’ access to the courts.  See, e.g., Pinson, 761 F.3d at 
9; Lefkowitz, 146 F.3d at 612 (“[W]e agree with our fellow 
circuits that these fee provisions do not deny prisoners 
constitutionally guaranteed access to courts.”).   
 
The Court of Appeals in Torres raised a different 
ground for fearing that simultaneous recoupment would bar 
access to the courts, expressing concern that a prisoner who 
was required to pay 100% of his inmate account funds to 
service his filing fee obligations would not be able to engage 
in further legal action.  But the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit effectively addressed this 
concern in Pinson, explaining that “the PLRA’s safety-valve 
provision, § 1915(b)(4), separately” ensures that insufficient 
funds will not bar inmates from bringing suit.  Pinson, 761 
F.3d at 8.  Section 1915(b)(4) provides that “[i]n no event 
shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or 
appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the 
prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the 
initial partial filing fee.”  Section 1915(b)(2) provides 
additional protection, because it provides for collection of 
fees only where a prisoner’s account exceeds $10. 
 
 In light of prisons’ obligations to provide inmates with 
supplies necessary for humane confinement and meaningful 
access to the courts, and considering the statutory safeguards 
the PLRA provides for destitute inmates, I conclude that the 
canon of constitutional avoidance does not compel sequential 
recoupment. 
 
       II. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
